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ABSTRACT This literature review paper focuses on existing vulnerabilities associated with global
navigation satellite systems (GNSSs). With respect to the civilian/non encrypted GNSSs, they are employed
for proving positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) solutions across a wide range of industries. Some of
these include electric power grids, stock exchange systems, cellular communications, agriculture, unmanned
aerial systems and intelligent transportation systems. In this survey paper, physical degradations, existing
threats and solutions adopted in academia and industry are presented. In regards to GNSS threats, jamming
and spoofing attacks as well as detection techniques adopted in the literature are surveyed and summarized.
Also discussed are multipath propagation in GNSS and non line-of-sight (NLoS) detection techniques. The
review also identifies and discusses open research areas and techniques which can be investigated for the
purpose of enhancing the robustness of GNSS.
INDEX TERMS GNSS, GNSS vulnerabilities, GNSS robustness, Positioning, Navigation, Timing
I. INTRODUCTION
GLOBAL navigation satellite system (GNSS) is asatellite-based positioning, navigation and timing
(PNT). Currently, numerous GNSSs are at various stages
of deployment and operational capacity. The American led
global positioning system (GPS) is arguably the most well-
known and often synonymously interchanged with GNSS
in terminology due to its established usage in the market.
Nonetheless, it sits alongside the European led GALILEO,
Russian led GLONASS, Chinese led BeiDou, Indian led
INRSS and the Japanese led QZSS [1]. As a collective frame-
work, GNSS has established itself as a globally dominant and
cost effective technology for outdoor PNT [2]. Most GNSSs
(GPS, GLONASS and BeiDou) are designed to provide two
services: one is free of charge for civil, commercial, and
scientific use while the other is restricted for military and
government use only [3]. In its current state, GALILEO
provides free services only for civilians. By 2020, GALILEO
will reach its full capacity by offering four services across
both the civilian and military sectors. These services are
known as: Open Service, High Accuracy Service, Public
Regulated Service and Research and Rescue service [2]. By
introducing authentication to the Open and High Accuracy
service, significant value will be added to the downstream
market via new applications [4].
Recently, there has been growing interest in adopting
automation in transportation networks, one of which is con-
nected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) operating within an in-
telligent transportation system (ITS) [5], [6]. Although there
has been significant developments in autonomous driving
technologies, the state-of-the art is still inadequate for fully
driverless operations [6]. The main challenge of adopting
CAVs relates to the ability of obtaining accurate position
and timing information for critical applications. For example,
in cooperative positioning, precise timing is required for
range-based vehicle and infrastructure localization [7]. In
addition, accurate positioning information is required for lane
detection, route guidance, collision avoidance and emergency
response [8]–[12]. With respect to other ITS related applica-
tions, GNSS can be adopted in driver assistance applications
such as route planning, accident black spot warning as well
traffic flow monitoring systems. Data obtained from GNSS
can also be fused with complimentary sensor data for ac-
tive control and passive safety systems, vehicle platooning,
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driver monitoring, pre-crash restrain and collision avoidance
systems.
In urban environments GNSS signals suffer from signal
blockage which results into multipath propagation and re-
duced positioning accuracy. Moreover, known vulnerabilities
of civilian GNSS to an attacker can render the service un-
usable for genuine users as seen in denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. By augmenting GNSS with other localization tech-
niques (such as RADAR or inertial sensors), it is possible to
mitigate some of these effects [10], [12].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the
operating principles of GNSS and an overview of existing
vulnerabilities is presented. Sections III and IV discuss phys-
ical degradations that occur in GNSS and their solutions. In
Sections V and VI, unintentional and international GNSS
threats as well as solutions adopted in the literature are
presented. The review paper is concluded in Section VII
which also highlights areas for future work.
II. THE OPERATING PRINCIPLE, PERFORMANCE
CRITERIA AND VULNERABILITIES OF GNSS
A GNSS-constellation consists of three segments: space,
ground, and user device[13]. The space segment is composed
of a number of satellites within a constellation. The ground
station is responsible of synchronizing the satellite’s clock
to the coordinated universal time (UTC) [14]. The network’s
ground stations also monitor the performance and health of
the satellites and adjust their orbits when required. In addi-
tion, ground stations are responsible for uploading data onto
satellites which can be used to resolve anomalous situations
such as ionospheric delays [14], [15].
Code division multiple access (CDMA) is used by all
GNSS constellations except GLONASS in which frequency
division multiple access (FDMA) is adopted [16], [17]. In
CDMA-based GNSS, the signals are modulated by a unique
pseudorandom noise (PRN) code and each satellite uses a
different PRN code. This enables the receiver to identify
and track unique satellite signals which share the same fre-
quency/channel [18]. In FDMA-based GNSS, each satellite
transmits on a different frequency with the same PRN code
used by all the satellites within the constellation [17]. An
overview of a subset of the existing GNSS constellations’
status, number of satellites as well as their access techniques
is presented in Table 1. In order to transmit the satellite
navigation messages through the radio frequency spectrum,
GNSS coded signals are modulated using binary phase shift
keying (BPSK) and variations of binary offset carrier (BOC)
[18], [19]. The modulated navigation message contains the
location of the satellite (ephemeris data), transmission time,
and other information that can be used to calculate the time
and position of the user device [20].
A. GNSS OPERATING PROCESS
This subsection provides a basic description of how a GNSS
receiver calculates its position and timing information, with
particular focus on GPS as an example of GNSS. GPS
TABLE 1. A subset of GNSS Constellations
System Owner Number Status Access
technique
GPS USA 32 Fully operational CDMA
GLONASS Russia 26 23 Fully operational,
1 in preparation, 1 on
maintenance and 1 on
test
FDMA
GALILEO EU 26 22 fully operational,
planned to reach 30 by
2020
CDMA
BeiDou China 14 14 Fully operational,
planned to reach 35 by
2020
CDMA
satellites use three RF links in the L band spectrum (L1, L2
and L5) to transmit GNSS signals. The signals transmitted
are made up of a RF carrier, data waveform and spreading
code/PRN. In the case of GPS L1 Course Acquisition (C/A),
which is also called clear access code (C/A), the PRN code
is repeated every 1ms and has a pattern of 1023 bits with an
autocorrelation property that allows the receiver to track the
received signal [21].
The operating process of a GPS signal reception is in three
stages, which are referred to as: acquisition, tracking & corre-
lation and decoding the navigation message [22]). During the
acquisition phase, the receiver searches for satellites in view.
It then obtains an estimation of the time of arrival (ToA) for
each of the available satellites and an estimation of the carrier
phase to initiate the tracking [22].
In order to acquire a signal, the receiver generates a local
replica of the transmitted code block and attempts to align it
with that obtained from the satellite [23]. When the replica
aligns with the actual incoming signal into the antenna, the
correlation is at its peak [24], [25]. The goal of the correlation
process is that the receiver obtains the ToA, carrier phase and
an estimate of the pseudorange measurement for each of the
received signals [24]. In the code tracking phase, a tracking
lock loop is implemented to further align the local replica
with the code in the received signal. The code tracking loop
correlates the incoming signal with three replica codes of
the transmitted code block: Early (E), Prompt (P) and Late
(L) with a half chip phase differences between E, P and L
[26] (as depicted in Fig.1). Once alignment is achieved, the
navigation message is decoded. At this phase, the receiver
demodulates the encoded signals and obtains the ephemeris
and clock correction information [23]. Given that the ToA in
the receiver is measured using a different and less accurate
clock, a timing error results from the radio-based distance
estimation [10], [27]. This timing error is referred to as the
clock bias (δt). The pseudorange to each satellite (shown in
(1), where (x, y, z) are the user coordinates to be determined,
(xk, yk, zk) are the coordinates of the kth satellite and δb is the
clock bias (in meters) is solved iteratively in order to obtain
the user’s coordinates and clock bias.
ρk =
√
(xk − x)2 + (yk − y)2 + (zk − z)2 + δb (1)
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FIGURE 1. Receiver correlation process (adapted from [28]).
This receiver design is adopted to mitigate the effect of
the received signal power in the GPS receiver, given that the
signals arriving at the receiver on earth are in the range of
picowatts [25].
B. PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR GNSS NAVIGATION
The performance of a GNSS can be described by the ac-
curacy, integrity, continuity and availability [3], [29] of the
signal. These criteria are inherited from the required naviga-
tion performance (RNP) concept and they are discussed as
follows:
• Accuracy is the degree of congruence of an estimated
user position/velocity when compared with the true
value [12]. Accuracy is a critical performance measure
in precise timing and synchronization applications. Ex-
amples are financial transactions timestamp and timing
for telecommunications in rail applications [4].
• Integrity is a measure that characterizes the level of
correctness of the information supplied by the naviga-
tion system. It can be viewed as an indicator of the
trust which a user can have in the provided information
[30]. Integrity as a GNSS performance feature is ap-
plied to the protection level and the associated integrity
risk [31]. These two quantities are correlated with the
value of the pseudorange measurement delivered at each
epoch [32]. Moreover, integrity denotes the ability of a
system to provide the user with timely warnings when
the navigation system results are inaccurate [11], [33].
This parameter is usually reported as alert limit (AL),
integrity risk (IR), time to alert (TTA) and protection
level (PL).
• Continuity in GNSS applications refers to a reliable
operation whereby the system operates without failure
for a given period of time [34]. Thus, continuity pro-
vides an estimation of the probability that the navigation
system fails during an operation given that the system
was available from the start of that phase of operation.
Continuity builds upon both integrity and accuracy,
hence it describes the probability of having a reliable
operation over a specified period [30]. This concept is
essential in location-based services (LBS) applications
as well as railway signaling and rail control [29], [35].
• Availability generally represents the percentage of time
in which the navigation system is usable. For specific
road applications, GNSS availability is defined as the
percentage of the measurement epochs where the ter-
minal delivers the considered output with the required
performance irrespective of signal quality [35], [36].
In addition, the geometry of satellites in view also affects
the performance of a GNSS. The dilution of precision (DoP)
characterizes the position of the user and the distribution of
the satellites in view [37]. In a scenario where the satellites
are clustered close in the sky, the value of DoP increases
and performance is impaired [38]. Increased accuracy can be
obtained when the satellites are spread and physically distant
from each other [39].
Given that GNSS use cases have different performance
requirements, the performance criteria will depend on each
particular scenario. In ITS, accuracy is generally expected to
be within 1-20m. For urban GNSS applications, robustness
to spoofing and jamming, as well as indoor penetration are
considered as performance features for GNSSs [13], [40].
C. CURRENT AND FUTURE GNSS VULNERABILITIES
Although GNSS is now widely used and providing posi-
tioning, timing and navigating services with an acceptable
high level of accuracy in open sky areas, the situation is
different for challenging environments such as urban canyons
[13], [41]. Due to RF propagation effects, GNSS signals are
vulnerable to specific threats such as ionospheric delays and
RF interference phenomena [35], [42], [43]. Some GNSS
performance challenges exist even prior to signal transmis-
sion, for example clock errors and signal modulation faults
[44]. GNSS signals can also be affected by space weather as
seen in the case of space storms and are exposed to multiple
conventional cyber threats [45]. A typical example would be
an intruder intercepting a national marine electronics associ-
ation (NMEA) position report from a receiver and retrans-
mitting it with different coordinates. In this review paper,
GNSS vulnerabilities are discussed as physical degradations,
and intentional & unintentional threats.
III. PHYSICAL DEGRADATIONS IN GNSS
Due to electromagnetic (EM) wave propagation character-
istics, EM waves passing through the earth’s atmosphere
are affected in many ways [46]. While GNSS signal travel
through the wireless channel, the ionosphere introduces fre-
quency dependent delays in the transmitted signal [47], [48].
Ionospheric scintillation causes fading and scattering in the
signal which may result in loss of the signal power [49]. The
strength of the scintillation is dependent on the solar cycle,
space weather and the change of seasons [47], [48], [50],
and can virtually be eliminated by applying mathematical
calculations in a dual frequency receiver [51].
Buildings in dense urban environments affect the accuracy
obtainable from GNSS positioning and timing data in three
well known scenarios [52]. In the first scenario, the signals
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FIGURE 2. The effect of multipath interference on correlation function
(adapted from [55]).
are totally blocked and unavailable for navigation use [53].
A second scenario arises when the signals are received via a
reflected path due to the blockage of the line-of-sight (LoS).
This phenomenon is known as non line-of-sight (NLoS)
reception and the path delays could introduce localization er-
rors as much as 10m [54]. In the third scenario, both LoS and
NLoS signals reach the receiver and multipath interference
occurs. In most applications and environments, multipath
and NLoS effects are considered to be the main physical
degradations for GNSS receivers [55]. With respect to the
physical degradations, multipath/NLoS propagation affect
the code range, carrier phase, signal to noise ratio (SNR) and
polarization of received signals [56]. Consequently, the ob-
tainable accuracy is impaired by different effects in varying
magnitudes. Given that the correlation function is essential in
estimating the ToA of the received signal, large ranging errors
and inaccurate position calculation can result from shifting
the correlation function of the receiver [55]. Thus multipath
propagation affects the accuracy of the code and carrier phase
tracking. The positioning error introduced depends on the
strength of the reflected signals, path delay, phase difference
and the receiver design [57]. In Fig. 2 the destructive or
constructive multipath interference effect on the correlation
function is depicted. From this illustration, it can be seen that
the placement of the local generated replicas of P, E and L
is affected by the multipath signal’s time delay relative to the
LoS (direct) signal. As the constructive multipath adds to the
direct signal, P develops a positive timing error. This could
be noticed from the sharper peak of the composite correlation
function when compared to the correlation function of the
direct signal. In contrast, the composite correlation function
is pushed downwards when compared to the direct signal
function for destructive multipath interference. Consequently
a negative timing error is developed by P and a shorter range
is obtained since the measured ToA is earlier than the direct
signal.
A. INCONSISTENT PSEUDORANGE MEASUREMENTS
In GNSS multilateration, the ranging error is equal to the
difference between the length of the route taken by the NLoS
signal and the blocked route. The reception of a GNSS
signal in severe conditions, such as a reflected signal via a
skyscraper can result in errors larger than 1 km [58].
B. POLARIZATION CHANGE
Changes in the polarization of GNSS signals are usually as
a result of the reflections. While LoS signals received from
the GNSS satellites have a right-hand circular polarization
(RHCP), most of the NLoS signals either have a left-hand
circular polarization (LHCP) or a mixed polarization [59].
In order to reduce the position errors between LHCP and
RHCP GNSS antennas, more satellites need to be used in
multilateration [60]. From the study carried out in [60], the
position error difference between RHCP and LHCP reduced
by approximately 95% when the satellites used increased
from 4 to 9.
C. C/NO FLUCTUATIONS
Changes in the carrier to noise ratio (C/No) of received GNSS
signals in dense urban areas as a result of multipath could
either be constructive or destructive. While the constructive
multipath causes an increase in the C/No, destructive multi-
path results in signal degradation [55].
IV. SOLUTIONS TO PHYSICAL DEGRADATIONS IN
GNSS
In aviation and transport networks where timing and position-
ing solutions are critical, parallel GNSSs are used to provide
the receiver with signal measurement error correction and in-
formation about the GNSS performance characteristics [61].
Regional satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS) such
as the European geostationary navigation overlay service
(EGNOS) and the wide area augmentation system (WAAS)
can be used to enhance GNSS performance [9], [62]. Dif-
ferential corrections and integrity messages are usually cal-
culated at a central computing center and the corrections
are then transmitted using geostationary satellites covering
a specific geographical area [63]. In GNSS applications that
require precise positioning, mitigating ionospheric scintilla-
tion is critical [48], [50]. Its effect on GNSS receivers may be
the loss of signal lock by the carrier and code phase tracking
loops [48]. A number of methods have been proposed in
the literature to compensate for the delays caused by the
ionosphere layer. Some of these include computerized iono-
spheric tomography (CIT), iterative algorithms, non-iterative
algorithms and data assimilation techniques [64]–[67].
The scintillation degradation on a GNSS receiver’s per-
formance depends on the number of visible satellites for a
selected GNSS [47]. Thus, the use of a multi-constellation
receiver could increase the total number of visible satellites.
In [50], the authors investigated ionospheric scintillation
characteristics across the L1, L2 and L5 frequency bands.
The results suggested that dual and multi-frequency devices
can be used to estimate and compensate the delays caused
by the ionosphere. A similar method was adopted in [68] to
mitigate the effect of ionospheric delays. The result showed
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that for low power devices, the combination of L1 and L2C
was optimal and L1 + L5 was suitable for devices with-
out power constraints. The modified receiver also included
a Doppler-aided two-frequency signal tracking unit. The
troposphere (which is the lowest layer of the atmosphere)
also has an influence on the radio signal propagation. The
delay introduced by the troposphere is related to the local
temperature, relative humidity and pressure. Although this
delay is frequency independent and negligible in navigation
satellites, it can be compensated for in the receiver [69].
In the literature multipath and NLoS effects are usually
investigated simultaneously. Nonetheless, they introduce dif-
ferent effects and should be studied individually. In the
literature, three widely known techniques have been adopted
in mitigating these effects [70], [71]:
• Antenna based techniques
• Receiver based techniques
• Navigation processor based techniques
A. ANTENNA BASED TECHNIQUES
The authors in [2], [72] suggested that irrespective of the res-
onating frequencies, the design of an antenna’s gain pattern
plays a vital role in its immunity to interference.
More recently, the use of multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) antennas as a countermeasure for interference has
been investigated. By using adaptive antennas, the antenna
gain and pattern can be improved and it can be also used for
direction of arrival (DoA) measurements. With this direction
finding feature, the antenna system can determine the direc-
tion of the target and interfering signals [73]. However, in
addition to the antenna design, adaptive techniques require
the operation of an additional RF signal processing chain.
Given that LoS GNSS signals are RHCP, three techniques
(in increasing complexity) were proposed for multipath de-
tection/mitigation in [74] using a dual-polarization antenna.
These are: measurement weighting, range-domain multipath
correction and tracking domain multipath correction. These
techniques are essentially based on implementing individual
correlators for the RHCP and LHCP signal as well as mea-
suring the respective (C/No). The measurement weighting
method was implemented as a weighted-least-square algo-
rithm based on the satellite elevation in [59]; where the
Horizontal (Hor), North (N), East (E) and Height (Hi) are
location attributes for a test point. The multipath mitigating
method significantly reduced the average positioning error
by 110%, 79%, 151% and 74% for Hor, N, E and Hi. A
measurement weighting method was presented in [75] where
a dual polarized antenna was used to determine the exclusion
threshold and weighting for a real time kinematic (RTK)
phase-based system. The positioning setup used was based
on the Septentrio AsteRx-U dual antenna multi-frequency
receiver where only signals from the RHCP antenna port
were tracked. Since the LHCP signals require a higher C/No
in order to be tracked, the local code and timing information
obtained from the RHCP signals were replicated for the
LHCP correlator. The positioning solution improved the root
mean square (RMS) 3D error by: 3% in a static-foliage sce-
nario, 50% in a static-urban scenario and 11% for a dynamic
recording from a moving vehicle.
While these techniques are more efficient when they are
used in large antenna structures at a higher cost, they become
unsuitable for most of the applications that require smaller
and cost effective antennas. Miniaturization techniques such
as folding the antenna wire also can be used to reduce the
antenna dimensions. However, these techniques could alter
the return loss and reduce the antenna bandwidth [2].
B. RECEIVER BASED TECHNIQUES
In receiver based techniques, the design of the receiver is
modified in order to increase the code discrimination resolu-
tion. This results in reducing the code tracking errors (caused
by multipath interference within the wireless medium) and
path delays [76]. As a result, receiver based signal processing
techniques work by separating the direct and reflected signal
within the receiver. In other words, they can only mitigate
multipath signals and detect NLoS [53]. One of the important
measures that is often adopted in assessing the robustness of
a GNSS receiver to interference is the C/No [38]. In addition,
this parameter can be used to assess out-of-band (OOB)
interference and low performing satellites [54], [59], [71],
[77].
Frequency diversity or multi-GNSS receivers can be
used to enhance localization accuracy. From a multi-GNSS
constellation approach, [78] adopted a stochastic weight-
ing/exclusion function as well as combining GPS + Galileo
signals. Unlike constant (C/No) based weighting in [59], a
stochastic weighting function was adopted. The positioning
solution presented was made up of a code-minus-carrier
(CMC) multipath correction module, a pseudorange differ-
encing function for multipath detection and a stochastic-
based weighting function. In computing the navigation solu-
tion, the positioning framework used all the signals available
with iterative de-weighting applied when required. The iter-
ative weighting function used was based on the value of the
calculated horizontal DoP (HDoP) at each epoch. In order
to enhance the positioning framework, height-constrained
environments together with GPS + Galileo signals were
added to the framework. From the static field tests carried
out, the solution presented in this work was able to improve
the horizontal RMS error by 10 - 60%.
Since it is possible that the phase lag resulting from reflec-
tions can be relatively constant in a dual-frequency receiver, it
is expected that the SNR difference remains constant even in
the presence of multipath. In order to increase the multipath
detection probability, the use of a three-frequency receiver
was investigated in [79]. In this work SNR differences across
three frequencies were modelled into a threshold for de-
termining the presence of multipath. The accuracy of the
detector was evaluated using multipath observables (MP1,
MP2, MP51). The authors in [80] also adopted a linear
combination from a triple frequency receiver to reduce the
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multipath estimation error associated with dual frequency
receivers.
At baseband processing level, the resolution of the code
discriminator can be improved for the purpose of estimating
the delay. Some implementations in the literature include the
delay lock loop (DLL), early-minus-late (EML) correlators,
double-delta, strobe correlators, narrow correlators as well
as maximum likelihood estimators [81]. These techniques
are known to be effective in short/weak multipath scenarios.
However, they underperform in severe multipath conditions
[82] and also introduce large bias when the LoS signal is
weak. Moreover, they are less effective in mitigation carrier
phase errors [83].
Another receiver based multipath/NLoS mitigation tech-
nique adopted in the literature is vector tracking (VT) [84].
Rather than using separate DLLs to track the PRN of the
satellites independently, VT processes the channels together
by using an extended Kalman filter (EKF) for tracking as well
as user position calculation [84]–[86]. In [85], this technique
was implemented using a software defined receiver. The
VT setup presented used an EKF as a navigation processor,
replaced individual DLLs with a vector DLL (VDLL) and
a frequency lock loop (FLL) was used for carrier frequency
tracking. An adaptive algorithm was also introduced to tune
the noise covariance matrix for the EKF and NLoS sig-
nals were simulated using LoS echoes. The outcome of the
preliminary experiments carried out showed that the VT
technique implemented was able to indicate the presence of
multipath from the measurement noise. In addition, it was
also able to detect the injection of NLoS. The VT setup was
adopted in [86] and tested for long NLoS path delay and its
sensitivity to a strobe correlator. The effect of NLoS signals
was evaluated via simulations with the discriminator output
evaluated against a threshold. For a 2 seconds simulated
NLoS reception, the VT + (NLoS detection) technique re-
duced the upper bound of the localization error (RMSE) from
27m to 5m when compared with conventional tracking (CT)
and vector tracking. Prior to the simulated NLoS signals,
the upper bound of the localization error was approximately
5m for all three methods (VT, CT, VT + NLoS detection).
The authors also carried out experiments with a vehicle in
a multipath/NLoS environment. The proposed VT technique
reduced the mean position error from 30.20 m to 9.51 m when
compared with a single-epoch positioning system. The mean
error was further reduced to 8.66 m by replacing the early and
late correlators of the (receiver used) with a strobe correlator.
An adaptive equalization technique was adopted in [82].
The multipath mitigation framework was made up of a
neural network/support vector machine (NN/SVM) based
pattern recognition for multipath environment identification
and motion classification. A stochastic-gradient-based adap-
tive filter was also included for multipath compensation.
The classifier was evaluated using simulated channel models
which contain multipath components of a Galileo signal.
For most of the multipath environments investigated, the
results showed that the NN outperformed SVM except in a
suburban-vehicular environment. The adaptive filter adopted
was used to compensate for the multipath induced distortion
in the autocorrelation sequence by tuning the filter coeffi-
cients for the estimated autocorrelation function. In order to
reduce computational complexity, discrete wavelet transform
(DWT) was used to equalize the channel impulse response
(CIR). In comparison to a fixed strategy such as least mean
squares (LMS), recursive least squares (RLS) or wavelet-
based RLS, the adaptive filter framework with NN introduced
35% reduction in up-component RMSE.
C. NAVIGATION PROCESSOR BASED TECHNIQUES
At the navigation processor, a consistency check can be
applied to pseudorange measurements for the purpose of
enhancing the localization accuracy. With this method, the
pseudorange residual (test statistic) is evaluated against a
chi-squared threshold to determine the possible presence of
NLoS or multipath signals. This same principle is applied in
receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) [23], [87],
[88]. This multipath mitigation method is implemented as a
fault detection exclusion (FDE) algorithm whereby "faulty"
signals are detected and excluded based on the ability of the
receiver to obtain a group of self-consistent measurements
[88]. A FDE method was evaluated in [88] using two
algorithms: Greedy and Exhaustive. The former excludes SV
signals successively while the later finds a group of consistent
measurements. This work adopted a C/No based weighting
and a chi-square test was used to determine the threshold.
The positioning framework was tested for trajectories in
Tokyo, Japan with open-sky, sub-urban, middle-urban and
deep urban environments and was combined with DGNSS
for correction. For all the trajectories considered, Greedy
and Exhaustive FDE were able to introduce a 29% and 31%
decrease in the mean positioning error. In deep urban envi-
ronment, the Exhaustive FDE was able reduce the positioning
error by 8%. While the consistency check was able to find a
group of consistent measurements, the positioning solution
was erroneous due to NLoS and multipath signals.
3D mapping of buildings has also been adopted in the
literature for mitigating physical degradations in GNSS. The
ability of 3D models to predict satellite visibility was in-
vestigated in [41]. In most implementations, 3D mapping
is used to improve localization accuracy through shadow
matching, terrain height-aiding or NLoS detection [89]. In
[52], a position-domain integration of shadow matching and
3D mapping were used to improve horizontal accuracy in
a dense urban area. The framework calculated position in-
formation using both methods and evaluated two weighting
strategies for combination. The first method weights the
solution according to the covariances while the other weights
based on the assumption that one method is better suited
for across-street directions. The covariance based weighting
was able to reduce the RMS horizontal error from 25.9 m
to 6.1 m. The work in [52] was extended in [53] by using a
hypothesis-domain integration as well as evaluating Galileo
signals. By initializing the likelihood-based 3D mapping
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aided (LB-3DMA) and shadow matching with a least squares
3DMA ranging algorithm, the search areas were significantly
reduced. In the LB-3DMA framework, satellite visibility was
predicted and a likelihood score was associated with the
position solutions obtained from the measurements and the
error covariance. The shadow matching technique also pre-
dicts satellite visibility using boundaries from the 3D map.
A score was associated to the position solutions obtained
based on the error between the prediction and the C/No of
the satellites measured. In order to null false hypothesis,
joint ranging was obtained by multiplying the likelihood
from both methods. Within an urban/dense area, the proposed
framework was able to reduce the localization error from
24.4 m to 3.4 m. With regards to a 2-constellation setup,
negligible improvement was observed. This was associated
with the severe NLoS signals that impair the performance of
shadow matching.
For maximum reliability across a range of different chal-
lenging environments, advanced GNSS receivers should be
integrated with other navigation and positioning technolo-
gies such as inertial navigation systems (INS) [90], [91].
In scenarios where there is a prolonged GNSS outage or
NLoS signal propagation, GNSS/INS fusion can be used to
improve the positioning accuracy. In order to compensate
for multipath and NLoS effects in urban canyons, [92] used
an adaptive fuzzy unscented Kalman filter (AF-UKF) to
fuse INS from a gyroscope and accelerometers with a dual
constellation (GPS + BeiDou) GNSS receiver. By imple-
menting thresholds for satellite elevation angle, C/No, some
NLoS/multipath GNSS signals were excluded. The fussy
calibration logic implemented was based on the azimuth
difference between the received satellite and the ego vehicle,
elevation angle as well as the C/No. The framework was
tested in Nanjing, China which has typical urban propagation
features. In a dense area with high rise buildings, the AF-UFF
framework was able to provide 81% improvement to a EKF
based solution and 75% to a UKF only solution. However,
the limitations of this proposed solution is that under certain
conditions, the position accuracy might be degraded to some
extent. This is related to the observation noise covariance,
whereby healthy satellite signals that seem unhealthy would
be largely amplified.
In [93], Consistency check and double difference were
used to mitigate physical degradation in GNSS pseudorange
and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) ranging. Consistency check
was individually applied to GNSS pseudorange and the
V2V ranging. The outputs were then fed into a cooperative
positioning (CP) algorithm that computes the absolute and
relative position of all the participating vehicles. From the
measurement results obtained from u-blox M8T receivers,
the weighted cooperative algorithm was able to reduce the
mean positioning error from 17.71 m to 5.33 m when com-
pared to a LS iterative CP algorithm. While this framework
introduced significant improvements, the framework was not
evaluated in a dense urban environment.
Contrary to explicit methods such as V2V ranging, [94]
proposed an implicit cooperative positioning technique that
uses vehicle-to-features (V2F), V2V and GNSS ranging
for cooperative vehicle positioning. The physical features
adopted in this work are inactive cars, traffic lights and
pedestrians. The dynamic model was used to model the states
of the vehicle and a first order Markov model for non-
cooperative features. In a distributed architecture, a consen-
sus based Gaussian message passing (GMP) algorithm was
used for estimating posterior probabilities for cooperative
and non-cooperative objects. For a simulated trajectory with
rural and urban regions, the positioning technique was able
to reduce the localization error from 4.5m to less than 1m
(200 non-cooperative features). In a more realistic setup with
mobile pedestrians and severely degraded GNSS signals, the
framework reduced the upper bound of the localization error
from 40m to sub-meter accuracy. The results also showed that
increasing the number of participating vehicles reduced the
localization error. However, the improvement introduced is
negligible when the number of features is high.
Sparse estimation was adopted in [95] as a means of
mitigating multipath. This theory was adopted based on the
assumption that: multipath signals can be modelled as addi-
tive biases, most satellites in view are not affected and that
the measurement equation is linear with respect to the state
vector. Assuming a sparse vector representing pseudorange
and pseudorange rate errors, the method solved a modified
version of the LASSO problem with a weighting function that
is dependent on the C/No and satellite elevation. The frame-
work was evaluated against synthetic, real data as well as data
obtained from a typical outdoor scene. In comparison with an
EKF implementation from [96], the framework reduced the
upper bound horizontal and vertical RMS localization error
from 64.67 m to 47.22 m and 4.92 m to 3.43 m. In an urban
environment, the median horizontal error of the proposed
method was 0.04 m. With respect to the limitations of the
theory, the authors discovered that framework performance
degrades when the number of biased satellite channels ex-
ceeds 5.
D. REMARKS ON MITIGATING GNSS PHYSICAL
DEGRADATION
While significant mitigating techniques have been presented
in academia, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for
GNSS receivers have also adopted these multipath mitigating
techniques:
1) The Zephyr geodetic antenna from Trimble Navigation
which uses a n-point antenna feed to improve the
RHCP characteristics of the antenna. This in turn in-
creases the receiver’s ability to reject multipath signals
[98]. Other commercially available antennas such as
the NovAtel GPS Antenna [99] reject LHCP signals.
2) APME+ used in AsteRx-m2 Septentrio receivers. This
is implemented using additional correlators as poste-
rior multipath estimators for code and phase measure-
ments [100]. A similar method using a dedicated phase
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TABLE 2. Summary of solutions to GNSS physical degradation
Method (Reference) Features Performance Cost
Antenna based
Dual polarization antennas
[59], [75]
Individual front end for RHCP and LHCP signals
Individual correlators for RHCP and LHCP signal processing
C/No thresholds adopted for multipath-environment classification
Mitigation implemented as weighting, range or tracking correc-
tion
Positioning error improved signifi-
cantly by 110% (Hor), 79% (N), 151%
(E) and 74% (Hi) [59]
RMS 3D error reduction: 3% Static-
foliage, 50% Static-urban, 11% Dy-
namic [75]
High
Dual constellation
[78] adopted in [92], [93]
GPS L2, Galileo E5b
Pseudorange differencing
Horizontal RMS error improved by
10 - 60%
High
Phased array antenna
[97]
16-element antenna array
6 processing channels for signal processing
Programmable DSP with adaptive beam and null-forming
10 dB C/No gain
+10 dB multipath power rejection
High
Receiver based
Stochastic weighting
[78]
(CMC) multipath error correction
Height constraints, Pseudorange differencing, Dual GNSS
Horizontal RMS error improved by
10 - 60%
High
Frequency diversity recei-
vers
[79], [80]
Threshold based detection
SNR differencing and Code minus carrier
Evaluation of multipath variables (MP1,MP2 MP51)
Variation in test statistic shown to infer
multipath
Med
Pattern recognition &
Stochastic-gradient-based
filtering
[82]
Neural Network, SVM environment classification
Adaptive filter (Equalization)
Wavelet-based LMS (W-LMS) & Wavelet-based RLS (W-RLS)
35% RMSE improvement (up-
component)
Med
Vector Tracking
NLoS
[85], [86]
EKF with adaptive noise covariance
Strobe correlator
Early-Minus-Late delay lock loop (EML-DLL)
28.5% improvement (Mean error) Med
Navigation processor based
3D Mapping
3DMA + Shadow match-
ing[52]
Terrain height aiding, Position-domain integration
Use of building boundaries
3D Maps for satellite visibility, Consistency checks
76% improvement in RMS horizontal
accuracy
Med
3D Mapping
3DMA + Shadow match-
ing[53]
Terrain height aiding, Hypothesis-domain integration
Use of building boundaries, Galileo signals
3D Maps for satellite visibility, Consistency checks
86% improvement 3-constellation
86% improvement 2-constellation
(RMS horizontal accuracy)
Med
Consistency check
[88]
adopted in [52], [53], [93]
Greedy & Exhaustive FDE
C/No -based weighting, chi-square threshold
29% and 31% improvement for Greedy
and Exhaustive FDE (mean error)
8% in deep urban (Exhaustive FDE)
Low
Data fusion
[92]
UKF, RISS, Fuzzy Logic, Dual constellation receiver
Satellite elevation and C/No thresholds for NLoS/Multipath de-
tection/exclusion
81% improvement to EKF, 75% im-
provement to UKF
(Euclidean error)
Med
Cooperative positioning
[93]
Consistency check, Double difference
GPS, BeiDou
107% improvement to LS
(Mean error)
Med
[94] Implicit CP, GMP, Belief propagation
Kalman filter vehicle tracking
Peak improvement of 175% (200 static
features)
Upper bound error reduced from 40 m
to sub meter (Urban canyon)
(RMSE)
High
Sparse estimation
[95]
C/No & Satellite elevation based weighting
EKF, l1 regularization
upper bound RMSE reduced from
64.67 m to 47.22 m (Horizontal);
106.10 m to 44.72 m (Vertical)
Med
correlator has also been patented by Leica Geosystems
[101].
3) The use of phased arrays and digital signal processing
as seen in NAVSYS high-gain advanced GPS receiver
(HAGR). This system creates a composite signal from
a 16-element array which can create nulls in specified
directions [97]. The test results carried out by NAVSYS
showed that the HAGR P(Y) code beam steering sys-
tem increased the averaged C/No for the SVs tracked
by approximately 10 dB when compared to multipath
rejection antennas from [99]. In addition, the HAGR
attenuated the multipath signal powers by an additional
10 dB.
4) Fence Antenna Technology and the Advanced Multi-
path Reduction (AMR) from Topcon Positioning Sys-
tems Inc. Both patented techniques are used to filter
out multipath errors as well as reject multipath on both
code and carrier phase measurements [102].
5) The Q-lock algorithm from GeoMax. This algorithm is
designed to detect correction services for the purpose
of multipath mitigation [103].
In general, the ability to detect multipath/NLoS signals
provides a means for a system designer to either exclude
these signals or mitigate their effects in computing the posi-
tion solution of the receiver. The choice of the approach or the
resulting performance depends on several factors such as the
signal quality from other satellites, length of multipath delay,
signal-type modulation, code chipping rate, pre-correlation
bandwidth, number of multipath signals, relative power of
multipath signals, correlator chip spacing as well as the
8 VOLUME 4, 2016
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2973759, IEEE Access
J. Zidan et al.: GNSS Vulnerabilities and Existing Solutions: A Review of the Literature
code/carrier tracking algorithm [79], [104]. In Table 2, a
summary of the techniques discussed is presented. Since
some of the surveyed literature adopt multiple solutions,
some of the works appear under multiple methods.
V. INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL THREATS TO
GNSS
Given that GNSS signals received by users on the earth’s
surface have an extremely low signal strength, they are sus-
ceptible to RF interference which can result in a direct impact
on the performance of the navigation system [44], [46]. These
interference sources could either be unintentional or inten-
tional [2], [46], [105]. Unintentional interferences sources
such as multipath and other RF propagation mechanisms are
usually associated with the physical characteristics of the
radio signals. On the other hand, intentional interferences
targeted at "blinding" the receiver’s antenna with noise are
referred to as jamming [106]. They can affect geo-location
technologies by either degrading the receiver performance
or by causing a DoS [105], [107]. Moreover, interferences
from other radio standards such as digital enhanced cordless
telecommunication (DECT) could also blind or degrade the
performance of a GNSS receiver [108].
Jamming could also be unintentional. An example of this
could be the use of a personal privacy device (PPD). In most
scenarios, a PPD transmits a carrier at a desired frequency
to prevent a nearby GNSS receiver from functioning [109].
However, rogue devices could be used to misguide a user
device by transmitting false GNSS-like signals. This act is
known as spoofing and it’s more dangerous than jamming
as it is not always detected [110], [111]. Spoofing attacks
are generally divided into two main categories: replay attacks
(meaconing) and forged signal attacks [2], [111], [112].
VI. SOLUTIONS TO GNSS INTENTIONAL AND
UNINTENTIONAL THREATS
According to [113], most of the countermeasures for GNSS
threats can be classified under one of the following cate-
gories:
• Encryption mechanisms
• Codeless-cross-correlation measures
• Signal statistic analyzing methods
• Antenna based
A. ENCRYPTION MECHANISMS
This technique relies on the encryption algorithms for re-
stricting access to the signal. Encryption mechanisms usually
involve some sort of communication security (COMSEC)
and navigation message (NAVSEC) measures [114]. They
are generally complex and expensive which makes them im-
practical for most end user applications [115]. However, they
are used in the GPS military signal communications. With
GALILEO, an affordable authentication service known as
open service–navigation message authentication (OS-NMA)
will be used by authorized user devices that are capable of
interpreting encrypted signals [2]. This service will only be
available to a selected number of authorities including the
European Commission and the European External Action
Service [34]. With an embedded authentication layer, it is
envisaged that GALILEO will provide improved positioning
accuracy and signal robustness [4], [116].
B. CODELESS-CROSS-CORRELATION MEASURES
In [117]–[119], the use of correlations between unknown
encrypted GPS L1 P(Y) code signals from two receivers
was used to detect spoofing. While these represented ini-
tial implementations, [120] presented a cohesive explanation
and demonstration of the proposed concept. Since there are
known signal relationships between the known carrier & code
phase of the C(A) code with the encrypted P(Y) code, part
of the encrypted signals at two receivers were correlated
for spoofing detection. The technique is premised on the
hypothesis that if a PRN is spoofed, the cross-correlation
statistic will be low. The signals used to test the algorithm
were obtained from commercial of-the-shelf (COTS) devices,
while the software processing was evaluated offline. An esti-
mate of the detection statistic was obtained from a quadrature
baseband mixing of the P(Y) code and an inter-receiver time
mapping was implemented to align the C/A code start/stop
times. From the experimental results presented, this frame-
work was able to detect a spoofed PRN. With respect to the
performance of the setup, the authors noted that for receivers
placed in the same location experienced cross-talk between
channels. This was associated with the Doppler shifts and
code delays of other GPS signals.
The framework presented in [11] extends the dual receiver
P(Y)-code correlation concept to an ad hoc network of
cooperative receivers referred to as “cross-check receivers”.
A 2-stage authentication process was adopted in this work:
a pair-wise check (which involves a P(Y) correlation) and
decision aggregation where pair-wise checks are combined
and evaluated. Three system architectures were evaluated
numerically in this work. In the first architecture, the user
and cross-check receivers collect in phase-quadrature (IQ)
signals for a specific PRN and the user sends a snippet of
the signal acquired to cross-check receivers. The cross-check
receivers correlate the signals and send a decision to the user.
The user then performs decision aggregation and determines
if it has been spoofed or not. In the second, the user performs
both correlation and decision aggregation. Consequently in-
troducing additional delay. This method allows the user to
exclude malicious cross-check receivers and also minimize
radio transmissions. In the third, a third party server collects
these signals and performs both correlation and decision
making tasks. Given that the remote server (or third party)
has more computing resources, this approach is fast, scalable
and can also be used for position/time assertion. From the
numerical analysis carried out, the authors showed that:
• An increased number of cross-check receivers increases
performance.
• For a fixed probability of false alarm, probability of
missed detection decreases exponentially with increas-
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ing number of cross-check receivers.
With respect to the pair-wise checks, the authors also carried
out measurements in 1) an urban location characterized with
low SNR and low satellite visibility (3 satellites visible) 2)
an open space characterized with high SNR and high satellite
visibility (10 satellites in view). At the urban location, two
static receivers were 3000 km apart and the authentication
framework was able to detect spoofed signals as the test
statistic was less than the specified threshold. For the open
space scenario, the mobile receivers were spaced 22 km
apart. The framework was able to detect spoofing, however,
the test statistic dropped rather slowly.
C. SIGNAL STATISTIC ANALYZING METHODS
This approach either implements consistency checks or a
statistical tests on features such as automatic gain control
(AGC), clock error, signal quality, signal power, propagation
delay and the angle of arrival (AoA) [121], [122].
By observing the discrepancies between the GPS and free-
INS position solution, a tightly coupled residual RAIM GPS-
INS system was presented in [123] for detecting spoofed
GPS signals. In contrast to the typical RAIM based platforms
where redundancy is via multiple satellites, a gyroscope +
accelerometer based INS was used to provide redundant
measurement variables. The authors noted that for improved
performance, it is essential to regularly calibrate the system
due to diverging covariance errors of the inertial sensors.
The framework was evaluated by determining a worst case
spoofing scenario that maximizes the IR for 8 minutes and
the simulated use case was a precision landing phase for
an aircraft. From the results presented, if the spoofer has
substantial knowledge of the user’s trajectory, the framework
could not detect an attack.
The authors in [110] presented structural power analysis
(SPA) as part of a spoofing detection method (SPM). The
SPM was made up of an AGC monitoring unit, a SPA unit
and an acquisition level detection unit. Within the SPA unit,
spoofed PRNs are detected prior to despreading by inspecting
the power spectral content. After passing through the SPA
unit, spoofing can also be detected at the acquisition level
block by either using a cross-ambiguity function (CAF) that
evaluates correlation peaks or by detecting anomalies in the
total number of correlation peaks.
In [124], the authors discussed the use of absolute power
monitoring techniques to reduce the effect of a spoofing
attack. The study first illustrates that a C/No discrimination
method is not an effective spoofing countermeasure when it
is used alone. The authors showed that if the receiver is able
to detect changes in the noise floor, this enhanced capability
can be combined with C/No discrimination to detect spoofed
PRNs. A similar technique that characterises the noise floor
is presented in [44]. The method presented is quite robust
provided that the code phase difference between the authentic
and spoofed PRNs is > 1.5 chips. The technique referred
to as the total signal energy measurement (TSEM) method
was shown to outperform the SPA implementation in [125].
The authors evaluated the technique via simulation for four
different scenarios with equal number of spoofed and au-
thentic PRNs. For a scenario whereby the spoofing received
power increases over time, the TSEM method could detect
the spoofed signals when the spoofing power exceeded the re-
ceive power of authentic signals. In the presence of multipath
signals, the simulation result showed significant variations in
the test statistic. While it was noted that this could result in
higher false alarm rate, this drawback can be mitigated by
combining the TSEM with a multipath rejecting antenna or a
suitable mitigating technique presented in Section IV.
With respect to analyzing the clock error, [126] presented a
spoofing detecting solution that correlated the clock bias with
the receiver motion. With this approach, spoofing was de-
tected if there was a deviation between the position-velocity-
time (PVT) solution and the prediction. The accuracy of this
approach was reported to vary with the receiver’s trajectory,
clock stability and the estimated parameters for the clock
model.
Signal quality monitoring (SQM) can also be used for
detecting spoofed signals [127], [128]. This technique is
based on Neyman Pearson (NP) detection theory. The NP
theorem is adopted in GNSS signal processing to identify
distortions in the correlation peak. By evaluating a metric
or a combination of metrics (which characterize the signal
quality) against a predefined threshold, this technique can
be used to detect spoofed GNSS signals [127], [129]. In the
literature, two metrics have been widely adopted for SQM,
these are the Delta test metric and the Ratio test metric [130].
The early-late phase (ELP) metric has also been proposed
in [131]. Given that the GNSS receiver is able to estimate
the statistics of the metrics prior to the attack, two Ratio test
metrics were used in [127] alongside an additional correlator.
The proposed SQM framework was evaluated for a real case
scenario from [132]:-Scenario 6. The authors showed that a
single SQM metric was not sufficient in detecting a spoofed
signal since the effects of the spoofer occurs at slightly
different time slots for the individual metrics adopted. By
observing the detection ratio of both metrics, the authors
showed that the metrics adopted in the framework were able
to track the spoofed signals. Furthermore, the results showed
that the metrics selected had different characteristics and a
joint detection approach was suggested. Since these SQM
metrics are generally complementary [127], [129], a multi-
metric joint detection SQM technique (based on the ELP +
Delta and ELP + Ratio test metrics) was presented in [129].
The authors evaluated two metric combination strategies:
the Amplitude combination (AmpM) and the Probability of
false alarm combination (PfaM), with the simulation results
showing that the PfaM had a better performance with respect
to spoofing detection. The simulated results showed that
individual SQM metrics (Delta, Ratio and ELP) attained
similar probability of detection. With the ELP combined with
either metrics using the PfaM combination, a 20% improve-
ment was introduced in the detection ratio. The authors also
evaluated the framework ([132] Scenario 2 & Scenario 3).
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In both scenarios, the Pfa (ELP + Ratio) attained a 100%
detection rate during the spoofed signal window. The SQM
techniques discussed in this subsection are typically limited
by the fact that multipath can also cause distortions in the
correlation function peak. As such, spoofing detected using
this technique could be as a result of multipath delay of the
received signals.
With respect to classifying multipath, spoofing and jam-
ming, [133] implemented a power-distortion detector that
attained a false alarm rate of less than 0.6%. The detec-
tion statistic in [133] was based on the received power
and symmetric difference measurements. The receive power
measurements are premised on the fact that interference in
the bandwidth of the RF front end will cause distinguishable
variations in the received power. While other events can
also cause power variations, the authors combined this with
the so-called symmetric difference metric since it is easy
to implement. A Bayesian M-ary hypothesis testing frame-
work was adopted for classifying the absence or presence
of interfering signals: multipath, spoofing and jamming. The
interference detector was evaluated against real GNSS data
for spoofing, multipath and jamming. The performance of the
detector showed that all occurrences of spoofing or jamming
were detected. For a severe case where the spoofed signal
controls the interference-to-authentic carrier phase offset and
executes a nulling-and-replacement attack, the detector clas-
sified spoofing as jamming for over 90% of time.
Similar to FDE techniques adopted in GNSS physical
degradation, [134] recently adopted a loosely coupled INS
+ GNSS framework (based on Kalman filter innovation)
for spoofing detection. For a given time window, the au-
thors evaluated two averaging methods: innovation averaging
whereby by the normalized sum-squared innovations at each
epoch is averaged or the measurement averaging whereby
averaging is done within the whole time window followed by
a snapshot. The performance of the spoofing detection pre-
sented was compared with traditional snapshot methods and
the results showed that the framework (innovation or mea-
surement) performed better in detecting ramp-type spoofing
profiles with low drift magnitude (< 0.5 m/s). With respect
to low drift spoofing profiles, the authors showed that the
measurement averaging technique slightly outperformed the
innovation method since it is less affected by spoofing attacks
with a long measurement update cycles.
D. ANTENNA BASED METHODS
A single antenna GNSS receiver integrated with a reduced in-
ertial sensor system (RISS) was presented in [136] for robust
navigation. Although the positioning accuracy was improved
by the RISS, the performance degraded when exposed to
jamming or spoofing signals. This framework was extended
in [46] by integrating it with an antenna array. The result
showed that the array provided better estimation of the spoof-
ing signal DoA when compared with a single GPS antenna.
Moreover, the framework presented was able to detect and
mitigate spoofing signals. The enhancement offered through
multiple antennas is attainable since the signals impinging
on an array have spatial features which can be manipulated
to mitigate spoofing from an EM propagation point of view
[138].
With respect to multi antenna strategies, a two-antenna
spoofing detection system was developed in [135]. The ap-
proach adopted relied on the difference between the DoA of
the authentic and spoofed signals. The positioning setup was
tested under various spoofing attacks with varying transmit
power at different locations. While the test results showed
that the navigation system detected more spoofing signals
when compared to RAIM, it requires an advanced phase-
locked loop (PLL) to track the carrier phase. The concept of
transmitting null signals from a digital beam former has also
been reported in the literature [137]. By using correlators and
matrix processing to the array outputs, synthetic nulls can be
created in the direction of the spoofer.
An array method was also proposed in [138] for simul-
taneously suppressing spoofing and jamming signals. The
framework presented was made up of a jamming suppression
unit (JSU), spoofing suppression unit (SSU) and a useful
signal enhancement unit (UEU) connected in tandem. Since
jamming involves signals with higher power, all the signals
from the array are fed into a JSU prior to spoofing processing.
Three scenarios involving spoofing/jamming signals were
investigated in this work. In order to evaluate the perfor-
mance, the authors compared the array gain with [139] and
[140]. The summary of the results presented showed that
the proposed method was able to generate deep null beams
towards jamming and spoofing signals as well as enhance
the array gain towards authentic signals. While the array
method presented showed promising results, it is based on
the assumption that the spoofed signals/PRNs are from the
same direction.
In Table 3, a summary of the literature discussed in this
section is presented. It is noteworthy that spoofing attacks
are dynamic and there are no spoofing countermeasure tech-
niques that are able to work in all scenarios. Consequently, it
is essential that the end user considers the cost, complexity
and other factors based on a given use case scenario [44].
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an overview of GNSS vulnerabil-
ities and the current solutions adopted in the literature for
the purpose of increasing the performance and robustness of
a GNSS receiver. From the surveyed literature, it is evident
that physical degradation severely affects the localization
figure of merit. With respect to intentional threats, jamming
attacks can be easily carried out, while spoofing requires
sophisticated techniques to avoid detection. This is because
the attack requires precise positioning information of the
target device. Moreover, the spoofer needs to adapt it sig-
nal strength and maintain a LoS to the target device. This
scenario is quite challenging for moving targets. In Table
4, an impact summary is presented. This table quantifies
the possible effects the surveyed vulnerabilities have on the
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TABLE 3. Summary of solutions to GNSS intentional and unintentional threats
Reference Method/Features Complexity Cost
Encryption Mechanism
[114]–[116] Provides improved positioning accuracy and security. Involves
COMSEC and NAVSEC measures
(OS-NMA) authentication service is an application of these tech-
niques.
High High
Codeless-cross-correlation Measures
[11] Cross-correlation of P(Y) from user and ad hoc cross-check
receivers
Cross-check receivers could be unreliable
Third party position assertion, Hypothesis testing
Med Med
[117]–[120] Cross-correlation of P(Y) from reference and test receiver
Susceptible to meaconing and cross-talk
High Med
Signal statistic analyzing methods
[44] Noise floor estimation
Requires code phase difference > 1.5 chips
Requires additional multipath mitigation technique
Med Med
[110] SPA inspects the power spectral content prior to despreading Low Med
[123] Tightly coupled INS-RAIM, Redundancy provided by multiple
satellites, gyroscope and accelerometer
Regular system calibration required
Med Med
[124] Absolute noise floor power monitoring, C/No discrimination Low Med
[126] Clock error analysis combined with receiver motion.
Provides reliable results in multipath environments
Med Med
[127] Signal quality monitoring using two ratio metrics.
Ratio metrics based on early, late, extra-early, extra-late and
prompt correlators
Med High
[129]
[132]
Joint SQM metrics based on ELP and Ratio/Delta metric.
Two metric combination methods presented.
Attained 100% detection rate for Scenario 2 and 3
Med Med
[133] so-called symmetric difference metric
Bayesian M-ary hypothesis testing.
Interference power advantage, interference-to-authentic code and
carrier offsets extracted from model
Med Med
[134] Kalman filter innovation for ramp-type faults
Two averaging techniques adopted for a time window.
chi-square based test statistic
Med Med
Antenna based methods
[46] Beam former points the antenna beam towards desired satellites.
Multi-antenna combined with INS and RISS
High High
[135] Inter-antenna vector from a 2-antenna system and DoA used for
detection
High High
[136] Single antenna combined with RISS Low Low
[137] Beam former used to send null towards the spoofer High High
[138] Deep nulls generated towards the spoofer & jammer
Does not require receiver hardware modifications
Assumes spoofing signals from the same direction
Orthogonal complement subspace adopted for jamming suppres-
sion
Medium Low
respective GNSS performance criteria.
From the surveyed literature, it is evident that a combi-
nation of techniques will be required to mitigate different
physical and logical vulnerabilities present in GNSS. More-
over, with the growth of automotive internet of things (IoT)
and increased wireless network penetration, radio access
technologies such as Wi-Fi can be used to enhance localiza-
tion in urban areas. As shown in surveyed works in [141],
this technology is now gradually being adopted in GNSS
receiver design. Furthermore, with advances in computing,
more machine learning/artificial intelligence techniques will
be adopted in addressing these GNSS vulnerabilities. In
regards to future research directions, the authors believe
the following areas can be further investigated for GNSS
robustness.
1) Hybrid GNSS: By combining different GNSS interfer-
ence countermeasures (such as ray-tracing, consistency
checks), multipath and NLoS effects can be mitigated
and the accuracy of the positioning solution can be
enhanced.
2) Multi-constellation receivers: Advanced signal pro-
cessing techniques can be adopted in multi-
constellations GNSS receivers. These techniques can
also be combined with other interference countermea-
sure to improve localization availability and accuracy.
3) GNSS/INS fusion: Positioning and localization accu-
racy can be enhanced by adopting advanced data sensor
fusion methods especially in limited GNSS coverage
areas. Further work is required in analyzing INS mea-
surement error sources as these affect the performances
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TABLE 4. Impact of GNSS vulnerabilities on performance criteria
GNSS vulnerability Accuracy Integrity Availability Continuity
A)- Physical degradation
• Ionospheric delays Med Med Med Med
• Clock errors Low Low Low Low
• Signal modulation faults Low Low Low Low
• Space weather Low Low Low Low
Multipath High High High Med
NLoS High Med High High
B)- Unintentional & intentional threats
ine Interference with other communication systems Med Med Med Med
Jamming - - High High
Spoofing High High - -
of fusion framework. GNSS/INS fusion can also be
used for spoofing detection. However, more studies
are required in reducing the complexity of these tech-
niques.
4) Cooperative positioning: This technique can be com-
bined with consistency checks in reducing the local-
ization errors obtained from GNSS receivers in urban
environments.
5) Multi- radio network: With respect to GNSS physical
degradation, multi radio access technologies can be
adopted to improve localization accuracy. With the
evolution of mobile/terrestrial communications, tech-
nologies such as Wi-Fi, 5G millimeter wave and algo-
rithms such as antenna beam steering/forming can be
adopted in urban/built environments.
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